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[1410

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

BATTLE OF ALBUERA.—This again is called a "*Victory*;" nay, and a "*glorious* "*victory*."—In a country, where it is possible to make any considerable number of persons look upon such an event in such a light, it may be thought absurd to attempt to place the matter in its true light; but, when one views the use that is made of the *press*; when one considers to what an extent the influence over that instrument is carried; when one considers how small a chance the great mass of the people have of obtaining any true information; when one considers with what boldness, with what a cool disregard of the contempt of the well informed, the venal writers propagate falsehood upon every subject, where falsehood best suits their purpose, and especially upon subjects connected with the war; when one considers all these things, the matter for wonder is, that any portion of the people in common life are able to form correct opinions as to what is, upon any occasion, doing in the countries where we are carrying on war.—But, though the deceptions propagated through these prints spread so wide, there are still some people, especially in the large towns, who think rightly; who are not to be cheated; and who serve as the channels for conveying *truth to others*, a duty, by the bye, that no man ought ever to neglect, when he has it in his power to perform it.—To such persons I address the remarks, which I am about to offer upon the *Battle of Albuera*, as the history of it has been given in our news-papers, having inserted below the official dispatches as published by the government, in the London Gazette.—In the first place, whatever may be the real character of these dispatches; whatever we may think of their contents; whatever degree of reliance we may be disposed to place upon their several statements and conjectures; we are to observe, and bear in mind, that they are only *Extracts*. Dispatches of which the following are **EXTRACTS.**" This is what is laid before the English people.—Now, what is

an extract? *To extract* means *to draw out*; and the word *extract*, used in the sense in which it is here used, means *pieces*, or *parts*, drawn out, or taken out. So that we have here, for the information of "the "*most thinking people*" that Lord Stormont, now Earl Mansfield, ever met with, *pieces* of the dispatches relating to the battle of Albuera.—*What parts* have been left in I cannot pretend to say; but, this I will venture to assert, without the least fear of contradiction, that the pieces of the Dispatches which are not published are not likely to contain any thing *more favourable* than those which are published; and, that the chances are about ten million to one on the other side. In short, it is only necessary to point out to the reader, the circumstance of this being a publication of *extracts* only; for, he will not want any thing to enlighten his mind as to what may be done when the publisher has the absolute power of selecting and culling paragraphs, sentences, and even words. What would any one say to a jury's giving their verdict upon extracts of evidence?—But, these remarks are quite useless. The reader must see through the whole of the matter in a moment; and, as we proceed, he has only to bear in mind, that we are remarking upon *Extracts* of Dispatches.—We will now take a view of these Extracts, and see whether *even they* warrant the appellations of *Victory*, and of *Triumph*, bestowed so lavishly upon the result of the battle in question.—From these Extracts, it appears, that the Spaniards, under their two chief commanders, and the Portuguese, under several British Brigadier Generals, were engaged on our side. The *numbers* of the allied army are not stated by Lord Talavera or by Marshal Beresford, at which we may be allowed to express our disappointment, especially as the Marshal has told us what were the *numbers* of the *enemy*. He says that the Duke of Dalmatia (whom he calls plain *Soult*) had 16 thousand men, and that he was joined by General Latour Maubourgh with five thousand men, making, in the whole, 21 thousand men. He afterwards says the enemy had 26,000 men. But, not a syllable does

he say about *his own* numbers, though they were certainly as easily known to him as those of the French. *Why* he did not do this, I shall leave to the reader to guess; and, we will, if the reader likes it, just inquire a little for ourselves into this essential point; for, as to victory, what is it unless we speak of numbers? If six men beat one, they do indeed gain a victory over him; but, they will hardly, unless they belong to a very impudent and bragging race, *boast* of such victory.——To judge, then, of the character of this affair, we must come to something like a certainty as to the numbers; remarking by the way, that the Marshal never says, in any part of his dispatch, or, at least, in any of the parts that are *published*, that his numbers were *inferior*, or, indeed, that they were *not superior*, to those of the French.——This inquiry is, too, the more necessary as our venal prints have, since the facts about our loss in *prisoners* and *artillery* and *colours* are come to light, been hard at work to *diminish* our numbers, and thereby to deceive and cheat the people into hopes that have, perhaps, no foundation, and, which is of more importance, into approbation of a contest which may finally lead to great national mischief.——Before we enter upon our estimate of numbers in this particular battle, let us, however, take a sort of bird's eye view of the armies, as to numbers.——We know very well, that, last Summer, we had 30 thousand *British* troops in Portugal, and 30 thousand Portuguese troops "*as good as any in the world*," these being the Marshal's own words. Since that we have sent to Lisbon more than 30,000 British troops; and, we have doubled the sum which was allowed for keeping up Portuguese troops, and, consequently, we ought to have 60,000 of each nation. Now, these troops have *died*, *deserted*, or been *killed*; or they are in being under our Marshal and Lord Marshal. If the latter, *where* are they? Or, rather, where were they at the time of the two last battles? If the army was equally divided between the Wellesley and the Beresford, then they had 60,000 each; and, if the latter had less than half, the former had more than 60,000 men and then what shall we say of his being *attacked* by the "*run-away*" MASSENA; and what shall we say, of the escape of BRENNIER from Almeida? If the Marshal had an army inferior to the Duke of Dalmatia (whom our "*coarse*" news-paper people call *Soult*), the Lord Marshal must have had with

him about 100,000 men, British troops, and Portuguese "*as good as any troops in the world*." Or, as I before said, if these men are not with our Marshal and Lord Marshal, *where* are they? That is the question that I should like to see answered. It is useless to jostle and boggle and shuffle about it: we are *paying* for all these men, and if they are not upon the spot with arms in their hands, *where* are they? We were told but a few weeks ago, that Massena was totally "*hors-de-combat*;" that his army was *no more*; that he was now *out of the question*. And, in about 20 days after this comes the news that he has *attacked* our Lord Marshal with a *superior force*, and, after a long battle, *carried off* some *hundreds of prisoners*.——Oh! "*thinking people*," how long will you continue to be the dupes of the base and venal scribes, who fatten upon your credulity!——Let us now, however, come to the particular case before us.——The Marshal tells us that the French had 21,000 men; but he does not tell us how many he had. We will, therefore, endeavour to form an *estimate* of his force, since he has been so obliging as to estimate that of the French for our information.——The news-papers told us, *before* the battle, that the Marshal had under him 22,000 British troops and about 20,000 Portuguese; but, we will not rely upon what they said, which was, I dare say, for the purposes of deception as usual.——One way of estimating the Marshal's force would be to take his number of *Generals* and give each of them the command of so many men; for, if they have not men to command, what use is there in our *paying* so many of them?——The Marshal gives us no return of his generals any more than of his other people; but, in the course of his dispatch, we find him bestowing praises upon no less than 5 British Major Generals and 1 German Major General. Here, then, are no less than SIX MAJOR GENERALS, and that, too, you will observe, *exclusive* of the Spanish army. Why, six Major Generals are sufficient for an army of 120 thousand men, and more than sufficient. Each of them has, or ought to have, several Brigadiers under him; and each Brigadier General has the command of several Battalions. In this battle I do suppose that there were not less than 30 Generals of all sorts. It has been remarked by foreign officers, that our army is always well stocked with generals. We have, I should suppose, some

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hundreds of Generals in our service; but, at any rate, we *pay* them, and, if they had not men to command at Albuera, they might as well have been at home.—That they had men, there can be no doubt; and, if the Marshal did not name his numbers, we will endeavour to come at them by calculation.—If we knew what Regiments or Battalions he had with him, we could come very near to the mark. However, we will take all that he has named in his return of *killed and wounded*. Some of the corps had, perhaps, no killed or wounded at all, and, of course, those corps are not named; but, I will take those that *are* named, and I will give the list and the *strength* of them, as that strength was *stated to the House of Commons in February last*; and, upon which statement *pay* was voted by that most Honourable House. I, of course, cannot come at the strength of the *Portuguese* battalions; but, we must guess at that: to get at the real strength of the British and the Germans is the main thing; and this we shall do pretty nearly in spite of the frauds, in spite of the millions of lies, of the venal news-papers.—The following Regiments and Battalions are, as the reader will see, named in the Return of the Killed and Wounded, being No. IV of the Returns, as published in the Gazette. All these corps, of which he gives the return of the killed and wounded, he had with him in the battle, of course. Nobody can deny that, and therefore, these we will take as their strength was laid before the Honourable House in February last, and, as I said before, according to which strength, *pay* has been voted for them out of the people's taxes by that Honourable House.—The Artillery and Engineers I have been obliged to guess at; and whether I have over-rated the numbers, or under-rated them, I must leave the reader to judge.

BRITISH.

3rd Dragoon Guards	916
4th Dragoons	916
13th Light Dragoons	916
Total British Cavalry.....	2,748
3rd Foot, 1st Battalion ...	805
7th - - - 1st and 2d Batt.	2,299
13rd - - - 1st Batt.	805
17th - - - 3rd Batt.....	1,359
18th - - - 2nd Batt.....	929
19th - - -	930
21st - - - 2nd Batt.....	824

34th - - - 2nd Batt.....	929
39th - - - 2nd Batt.....	1,039
40th - - - 1st Batt.....	1,120
48th - - -	1,648
57th - - - 1st Batt.....	910
60th - - - 5th Batt.....	1,059
66th - - - 2nd Batt.....	718
97th - - -	720
Total British Foot.....	16,094

GERMANS.

1st Light Battalion.....	888
2nd Do.	888
	1,976
British Artillery.....	
British Artillery Drivers.....	
German Artillery.....	3,500
Engineers.....	
	24,318

Deduct for deaths, desertions, sickness, &c. since the month of February, being *one fifth* of the strength of the above named Corps.....

Total British and Germans in the field.....

Now, I should be glad to know what any venal man could say against the fairness of this estimate. That I have taken the numbers as returned to the Honourable House on the 20th of February last cannot be denied. It cannot be denied, that that Honourable House have voted *pay* for these corps *agreeably to those numbers*; and, therefore, to suppose that the men were *not in existence* is to suppose that the money would be misapplied. At any rate, we were *paying* for these men. And, indeed, there can be little doubt of their having actually been present in the battle, except such of them as may have died or deserted since February; and, for these casualties, I have made a pretty liberal allowance in deducting one man out of every five.—As to the Artillery and Drivers and Engineers; we do not pay for much less than *forty thousand* altogether, and, perhaps, 15 or 20 thousand horses; so that, if there were not 3,500 present at a battle like this, *what are they kept for?* Indeed, there is every reason to suppose that there were more than 3,500, when we consider that our army was just beginning

the siege of a strongly fortified town.—To me, therefore, it appears very evident, that there could not have been less than 20,155 British and German troops in this battle. The Spaniards could hardly have been under 12 or 14 thousand; for, we find them forming the right wing of the army and in *two lines*; and, the Portuguese, who do not appear to have had much to do in the battle, but who made part of the force, and are *known* to be “as good as any troops in the world,” could not be less in number than the British; or, at least, what reason is there to suppose that they were? For again I ask, *where were they*, if they were not at that battle? We, the people of this kingdom, are paying for an army of 60,000 Portuguese, paid and kept in all respects like British troops. The reader knows, that the Honourable House long ago voted 2 millions of pounds for the Portuguese army this year. Now, observe, that 141,000 British Infantry cost us in a year £.4,248,669; and, if the reader will be at the pains to make the calculation, he will find, that, at *this rate*, 60,000 men cost us £.1,807,944. So that, for the £.2,000,000 we ought to have more than 60,000 Portuguese for the *whole year*; and, observe, always *effective*; always *in existence*; always, as Mr. Villiers said, actually in soldiers’ cloaths.—Well, then, my friends and countrymen of this “most thinking,” nation, were could our 60,000 Portuguese soldiers be, if there were not a good 20,000 of them at this battle? The *money* was long ago voted; and, surely, the *men* ought to be forth-coming; and, if ever forth-coming that day was the day.—To do them justice, however, they appear from the Dispatches (I beg pardon, I mean *Extracts*) to have been there in great numbers; for mention is frequently made of the deeds of valour and sagacity of those who *commanded* them; and, of course, the men themselves must have been these.—Upon a review of what has been said, the reader will, I should think, have no doubt that our Marshal must have had nearly 40 thousand men in the field exclusive of Spaniards, and that, in the whole, there were not opposed to Dalmatia less than 50,000 men at the *very lowest*. Indeed, from all that I have seen, I am convinced, that the French commander made little or no account of any but the British troops; and, supposing himself a match for them, he marched to the attack with little apprehension of failure.—Such is

my estimate of numbers; and I am satisfied, that it will be very difficult for any one to show, that I have estimated unfairly.—Let us now look a little at the *result* of the battle.—We are said to have *kept our ground*. How! The enemy found us besieging a town, and he compelled us to raise that siege for a time at least. But, he retreated. He went back the way he came. And so does a sallying party; but it does not follow that such party is not successful. That Dalmatia attacked our army with *greatly inferior numbers* is manifest. He might exceed us in *Cavalry*; but as to general force he must have been much inferior; and that he mauled us pretty decently we have the proof in the list of killed and wounded. It is said, that *dead men tell no tales*; but, the lists of dead men tell tales, and such tales too as require all the powers of even our venal press to hush to silence. But, there is one description of men who blab more, and tell more ugly tales than either killed or wounded, and these are the *missing*; that is to say, those who either *desert* to the enemy during the battle, or who are *taken prisoners* by him; for, in a case where you keep the ground you fight on, you cannot lose any of your men from wandering.—Now, in this battle there were a good many of these blabbers; and the reader may assure himself, that their number has not been *over-stated*, either by the author of the Dispatches, or by those who have treated us with *extracts* from them.—This is a capital consideration. This *making of prisoners* is the great feature in a battle, and, it is in fact, the best criterion of real victory. Our army is said to have made some prisoners too. “We have taken,” says the Marshal, “from 900 to 1,000 prisoners!” Why not tell us *exactly* how many? Why not regale our longing ears with the names of the officers taken? Alas! the Lord Marshal, in his dispatch, explains this: “The enemy,” says he, “left between ‘900 and 1,000 WOUNDED on the ‘ground.’” Our prisoners are the *wounded* men, then, who were unable to follow, or keep up with the army! Our venal printers, say, that we have found many officers, and several *generals* amongst the *dead*; but, we have not had the luck to take any of them *alive*. The French, who are, by these venal scribes, represented as having been covered with disgrace, have carried their prisoners *off*; they have carried them away; and they have got officers at

well as men. The prisoners they have taken form a list :

Majors	1
Captains	4
Lieutenants	9
Ensigns	1
Serjeants	38
Drummers	10
Rank and File.....	526

589

Here is a good half of a Battalion of British and German troops. Here are officers of all ranks under a Lieutenant Colonel. When have we seen such a list of French officers taken? And, if we lose officers and men thus, when we are *triumphant*, when we gain victories, and even *glorious* victories, what have we to expect in cases of defeat? —We shall hear what the French will say, in their account of this battle; but, I think we may anticipate no small boastings at this circumstance of having carried off so many officers and men from a field where they were compelled to yield to superior numbers, and numbers too so greatly superior. —Our venal prints have stated the British and German force at 8,000 men. How false this must be I have shown; but, if it were true, what a fact would it be, when viewed in conjunction with this statement of missing? If it were true, that there were in the battle only 8,000 British and German troops, then the world would have to note down, that the French carried **ONE THIRTEENTH** part of the whole of them off prisoners from the field of battle! The venal newspapers confess (by way, I suppose, of being beforehand with the French), that two of our regiments had *their colours taken from them* and carried off. But, this is no matter. The fact, that *one thirteenth part* of the whole of the British and German troops were taken alive and carried off bodily out of the field of battle would be such a fact as would beggar all the others that could be mentioned. It would be in vain to talk after that; in vain for the *TIMES* to exclaim: "Gallant hearts! the tears that fall from the eyes of relatives in England are not the only ones that will be shed for the heroes of this day!" in vain for the same paper to ask, "what is a greater proof of discomfiture than their abandoning their wounded;" in vain for the *COURIER* to talk about the enemy's "*choosing his place of*

"attack," when it is notorious that he came to the spot where our army lay; in vain for the same print to tell us, that "*now the nations of the Continent will no longer believe in French invincibility*;" in vain for this print to trump up the story that the two colours said to have been lost were taken one from an Ensign who refused to accept of life on the condition of surrender, and the other from an Ensign, who, being wounded, and on the ground, had tore them from the staff and secreted them in *his bosom*. In vain for them to attempt any such means; for, if they continue to assert, that the Marshal had but 8,000 British and German troops, we and all the world know, from his own account, that the enemy took away *one thirteenth* part of the whole of them; actually *took them off out of the field of battle*, and that, amongst the prisoners, were no less than *fifteen Commissioned Officers*; and, this fact is quite sufficient to fix the character of the battle. No man will ask for any thing more. No man that once hears this fact will ever ask *who gained the day*.

—Therefore, these attempts so much to lower the number of our own army makes against the character of what these same persons choose to boast of; for, no human creature will ever believe, that the French, who were able to carry off half a battalion of our men, did not retire before a greatly superior force upon the whole. —There is, too, not a word said about the loss of the Spaniards. The Marshal says he is unable to state *their* loss. And yet, one would suppose, that it was full as easy for him to state *that* as to state the loss of the *French*, all about which he is very circumstantial. The probability is, that the French may have carried off some of the Spaniards too. Nay, there is, perhaps, more than a probability of it. And, what a thing, then, is this to *boast* of! What an event is here to excite new hopes of the *deliverance* of Europe! —The circumstance of our chief annoyance having proceeded from the *Polish* troops is also worthy of particular notice; for, as this "*thinking people*" can hardly have forgotten, the *Polish* troops were said all to have revolted last year against their French officers. —These *Polish* troops had, however, singular advantages, it seems, the *thickness of the atmosphere* was in their favour; and they were mistaken for *Spanish horse*. This is very strange, and will, I imagine, plead but very feebly in palliation of our wonderful loss in pri-

soners.—The Marshal says, that Soult (Duke of Dalmatia) has retired with “a *tarnished reputation* ;” and the *Times* news-paper says, that the “*proof of his discomfiture* is, that he *left his wounded at the place of his retreat.*”——This paper has recently become devoted to the Wellesleys. But, did the writer perceive what his argument might lead to? Did he recollect, that we boasted of a Victory at *Talavera*; nay that we fired Park and Tower guns; and, what is more, gave Parliamentary Thanks, two Titles, and a pension of 3,000*l.* a year for three generations, to him who left his sick and wounded at that very *Talavera*? Did this newly-converted writer remember that? If he did, he would hardly have assumed, that the fact of the Duke of Dalmatia having left some of his wounded behind him at *Albuera* was a proof of his discomfiture.

——Some of the papers of to-day state, that the Duke of Dalmatia has issued Thanks to his Army for the valour which enabled him to obtain so signal a victory; and, it is added, that he boasts of having taken *three pair of colours, several guns, and a great number of prisoners*, and that the colours will be sent to Paris.——How such a story as this comes to be afloat I leave the reader to guess. The Duke of Dalmatia had hardly sent his orders to our camp. How, then, could this be known otherwise than from conjecture; and to that conjecture what could give rise?——Let us now, however, wait for the *French* account. “Hear both sides” is an old and good maxim, and *one side* we have heard.——We know that a *howitzer* was taken from us. What was taken from the Spaniards we have not been told; but, I, at present, see no reason to doubt the fact of the French having taken “*several guns.*”——There really is about this victory something more marvellous than about any other that I ever before heard of. It would seem to, have been a sort of *coup-de-main* on the part of the French. They seem to have rushed forward and killed and carried off a great part of their opponents without any serious design to remain upon the ground, and without supposing it possible to remain there.——We are told by our news-papers, that the French were superior *in artillery*; and this, too, you will observe, though they had come about a *hundred miles* to the attack. Good heavens what people these French must be! We were, too, setting about a regular siege. We ought to have had some artillery there.

We had long been collecting stores together for this siege; and, while this is going on, the French start out at 100 miles distance, and bring up to our very noses a superior artillery!——Now, then, reader, look back over all that we have been remarking on; and say, whether there is any ground for hope, *that we shall be able to drive the French out of the Peninsula*; and, observe, if we do not, all this expence in life as well as in money is lost. To me it has long appeared, that the true policy of Napoleon was to incite us to waste our force in that country. A war there which occupies all our attention, and draws off every man and every pound of food that we can raise, serves him surprizingly, while he is settling the northern part of his Empire to his liking, and building ships in all his arsenals. A reinforcement of 10 or 20 thousand men sent from France twice a year, will feed the war in Spain and Portugal without absolutely disheartening the people of England. Such “victories” as we have recently gained seem to me to be the very things that suit him. We are thereby induced to hasten off more troops, and consequently more money. The war in the Peninsula has come to supply the place of all others. It leaves France in perfect tranquillity, and, at the same time, gives us full occupation. There are only three sufferers; *England, Spain, and Portugal*. The French empire does not taste of the war, which affects it in so trifling a degree as for the people to have almost all the advantages of peace. They feel no *alarms*; they are in no “*crisis*”; they merely *hear* of the war in Spain and Portugal as we do of the endless wars in the East-Indies, to which it bears some resemblance; it is with them a matter of curiosity rather than of concern. How different is it with us! We look upon this war, and, indeed, we are told to consider it, as a war for our existence; our eyes are constantly upon the stretch towards Lisbon; we wish for, and yet we fear, the arrival of every packet boat; at the most trifling success, nay, at the escape from overthrow, we rejoice without moderation, and yet, in the midst of our exultation, our hearts bid us fear, that, in the end, we shall see the Peninsula in the hands of our enemy.——Reader, is not this the *truth*? Is not this our situation truly painted? Such, then, is the state at which we have arrived at the end of eighteen years of Anti-Jacobin war; of a war for the deliverance of Europe; and

still are there men to cheer us on in this pursuit.—The cause of the exultations which, upon occasions like this, we hear, is, our general dread of the power of the enemy. We imagine, that these “victories,” as they are called, tend to keep him from our doors; without reflecting, that he carries on the war against us with a *tenth* part of his force, that he makes the seat of war maintain his armies, and that he exhausts and enfeebles us against the day of his meditated attack, taking into view the state of our internal affairs, and especially the state of our *paper-money*. It is in his power to send 200,000 men into Spain and Portugal; but it is not yet his interest to do it. His object is to make use of the Peninsula as a drain of the resources of England; and, at the rate we are now proceeding, a more effectual drain could not, surely, have been imagined.—Such is my view of this matter; and, though it may tend to check the exultation of my countrymen, I am sure it is less likely to lead them into mischievous error than the sanguine expectations encouraged by the writings of the venal journalists.

WM. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
7th June, 1811.*

PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

*Resolutions of the Livery of London, passed
30th May, 1811.—SMITH, MAYOR.*

(Concluded from page 1408.)

That we agree with Mr. Pitt, whose words were exemplified in his own Administration, “That without a Reformation in Parliament, neither the liberty of the subject can be preserved, nor can we expect to have a virtuous or disinterested Administration.”

That we agree with Mr. Fox, “That unless there is an entire radical Reform, not only in the House of Commons, but in every branch of the Executive Government, there is no chance for this country to enjoy any blessing, or even to remain safe long; and that this Reform can never be obtained, unless there is a general and unequivocal expression in its favour by the people at large.”

That we agree with Mr. Burke, “That the virtue, spirit, and essence of a House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation. It is not instituted to be a control upon the People, as of late it has been taught by a doctrine of the most pernicious nature

and tendency; it was intended as a control for the People.”

That agreeing, as we do, with the above authorities, as well as the concurrent opinions of the greatest Lawyers, Historians, and Statesmen, which might be adduced; and observing, as we have done, the daily and lamentable departure from the principles of the Constitution—the rapid and unceasing progress of overwhelming influence and corruption, which threaten its overthrow—it is with the highest satisfaction, we see a considerable number of the most respectable characters in rank, talents, and property, now standing forward to endeavour to remove these formidable evils, and to restore the Constitution to its true principles, by a Reform in the Representation of the People in Parliament.

That we do therefore highly approve of the Vote of the last Court of Common Council, and do hereby concur with them in granting the use of the Guildhall on the 3d of June next, for the purpose of holding a General Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform.

That without attaching improper motives to such of our fellow citizens as may have been misled by the misrepresentations and unfounded calumnies of interested, designing, and unprincipled Jobbers, Contractors, and Placemen, who have long fed, and still hope to feed, upon our taxes, we cannot sufficiently reprobate their base attempts to divert the public mind from this great national question, to sow the seeds of dissension, and by every possible means to excite, whilst, at the same time, they hypocritically express their apprehension of, tumult and alarm.

Resolved,—That a Deputation of Liverymen be now appointed to present the Resolutions of this day to the Court of Common Council on Friday next, requesting their concurrence therein, as well as their co-operation with the Livery of London, in their endeavours to obtain a Reform in the Representation of the People in Parliament.

Resolved,—That Messrs. Billinge, Bromly, Blackett, Cole, Esce, Thorpe, Bedder, Bumsted, Scot, Peacock, Stevenson, Pearson, Rosser, Stooks, Pickard, Manning, Piper, Littell, Banks, Wort, and Letts, be the said Deputation.

Resolved Unanimously,—That the thanks of this Common Hall be given to the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, for his upright and impartial conduct on all occasions, and particularly for the firm an

independent manner in which he has, in the present instance, resisted all attempts to intimidate him in the exercise of his duty.

WOODTHORPE.

SMITH, MAYOR.

A Common Council holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London, on Friday, the 31st of May, 1811. —The Right Hon. the Lord Mayor informed the Court, that he had convened them together this day, in consequence of a requisition he had received from a great number of respectable Members of this Court, which was read.

The Right Hon. the Lord Mayor laid before this Court a copy of sundry Resolutions of an Especial Court of Aldermen, agreed to on the 29th inst. in relation to a Public Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform being holden in the Guildhall of this City, on Monday, the 3d day of June next, which were read.

The Deputation of the Liverymen of London, appointed at the Common Hall holden yesterday in the Guildhall of this City, attended at the Bar of this Court, and presented sundry Resolutions agreed to in the said Common Hall, which were read, and ordered to be entered on the Journals.

The Memorial of Sir John Throckmorton, Baronet, Chairman of the Committee of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform, in relation to postponing the public Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform from the 3d to the 10th day of June, was this day presented unto this Court and read.

The humble Petition of a great number of Liverymen of the City of London, against granting the use of Guildhall for a public Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform, to be holden on the 3d day of June next, was this day presented unto this Court and read.

A Motion being made, and Question proposed, that the Prayer of the said Petition of the Liverymen be complied with, and that the Resolution of this Court of the 22d inst. granting the use of the Guildhall for a public Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform, be rescinded accordingly;

An Amendment was moved by leaving out all the words after the first word "That," and substituting the following in lieu thereof:—"In an Address to his

Royal Highness the Prince Regent, agreed to on the 7th of February last, this Court did express the following sentiments, viz. 'Numerous other grievances we forbear even to mention, but there is one so prominent in the odiousness of its nature, as well as in the magnitude of its mischievous consequences, that we are unable to refrain from marking it out as a particular object of our complaint, and of your Royal Highness's virtuous abhorrence of the present Representation in the Commons House of Parliament—a ready instrument in the hands of the Minister for the time being, whether for the purpose of multiplying the just prerogatives of the Crown, or insulting and oppressing the people; and a Reform in which is therefore absolutely necessary for the safety of the crown, the happiness of the people, and the peace and independence of the country.

"That on other occasions similar sentiments have been decidedly expressed by this Court."

"That so far from this Court experiencing any change in these sentiments, it is at this moment more strongly (than at any former period) impressed with the justice and truth of them, and doth therefore concur in the Resolutions of the Livery of London in Common Hall assembled, presented this day to this Court, expressing at the same time its unalterable determination to persevere by all legal and Constitutional means in obtaining an efficient Reform in the Commons House of Parliament." And on the question being put, the Lord Mayor declared the same to be carried in the negative; and a division being demanded, and granted, there appeared 4 Aldermen, and 74 Commoners, besides the 2 Tellers, for the affirmative; and 13 Aldermen, and 104 Commoners, besides the 2 Tellers, for the negative—whereupon the same was carried in the negative,—then the main question being put, "That the Prayer of the said Petition of the Liverymen be complied with, and that the Resolution of this Court of the 22d instant, granting the use of the Guildhall for a Public Meeting of the Friends of Parliamentary Reform, be rescinded accordingly," the same was resolved in the affirmative.

Ordered, that the above proceedings be signed by the Town Clerk, and published in all the London Morning and Evening Papers.

WOODTHORPE.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PORTUGAL.—THE WAR.—*London Gazette Extraordinary. Monday, June 3, 1811.*

Downing Street, June 2, 1811.—Dispatches, of which the following are Extracts, have been this day received by the Earl of Liverpool, addressed to his Lordship by Lieutenant-General Viscount Wellington, dated Elvas, 22nd May, 1811.

On the night of the 15th instant I received from Marshal Sir W. Beresford letters of the 12th and 13th inst. which reported Marshal Soult had broken up from Seville about the 10th, and had advanced towards Estremadura, notwithstanding the reports which had been previously received that he was busily occupied in strengthening Seville and the approaches to that city by works; and that all his measures indicated an intention to remain on the defensive in Andalusia.—I therefore set out on the following morning from Villa Fermosa; and having received further information of the 14th, from Sir William Beresford, of the enemy's movements, I hastened my progress, and arrived here on the 19th, and found that Sir William Beresford had raised the siege of Badajoz, without the loss of ordnance or stores of any description; and collected the troops under his command, and had formed a junction with Generals Castanos and Blake at Albuera, in the course of the 15th instant.—He was attacked there on the 16th by the French army under the command of Marshal Soult; and after a most severe engagement, in which all the troops conducted themselves in the most gallant manner, Sir William Beresford gained the Victory. The enemy retired in the night of the 17th, leaving between 900 and 1,000 wounded on the ground.—Sir William Beresford sent the allied cavalry after them; and on the 19th, in the morning, reinvaded Badajoz.—I enclose reports of Sir William Beresford, of the 16th and 18th inst. on the operations of the siege to the moment of raising it, and on the battle at Albuera; and I beg to draw your Lordship's attention to the ability, the firmness, and the gallantry manifested by marshal Sir William Beresford throughout the transactions on which he has written. I will add nothing to what he has said of the conduct of all the officers and troops, excepting to express my admiration of it, and my cordial concurrence in the favourable reports

by Sir William Beresford of the good conduct of all.—All has remained quiet in Castile since I quitted that part of the country.—The battalions of the 9th corps, belonging to regiments serving in the Corps d'Armée in Andalusia, had marched from Salamanca on or about the 15th, and went towards Avila, and were to come by Madrid.—I send this dispatch by Major (Lieutenant-Colonel) Arbutnot, the Secretary of Marshal Sir William Beresford, who was present in the battle of Albuera, and can give your Lordship any further information you can require; and I beg leave to recommend him to your Lordship.

Extract of a Letter from Marshal Beresford to Lord Wellington, dated Albuera, May 16, 1811.

In conformity to your Lordship's instructions given to me on the 24th ultimo, in consequence of the then state of the weather, and our means of communication across the Guadiana having been destroyed by the sudden flooding of that river, and leaving my cavalry in Zafra, Los Santos, and Villa Franca, I placed the infantry with its head at Almandralejo, Azuechal, and Villa Alva, where were the divisions of Major-General the Honourable William Stewart and Major-General Hamilton; and the Honourable Major-General Cole's division with Brigadier-General Madden's brigade of cavalry in Merida, the infantry brigade of it commanded by Brigadier-General Kemmis, and that was intended for the attack of Fort Saint Christoval, at Montejo, and the light brigade German Legion under Major-General Baron Alten, at Talavera Real, leaving the light battalion L. L. Legion in Olivenca, during the period of waiting the fall of the water of the Guadiana, and the re-establishment of our bridge, it being of considerable importance to push the enemy from us as far as possible during the siege, as he had on our obliging him to retire from Llerana to Guadalcanal held the latter place.—I directed a small column of two thousand men composed of the 1st brigade 2d division, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel-Colborne, with two squadrons of cavalry and two Spanish four-pounders, to proceed from Almandralejo, by Ribera and Maquilla to Azuaga to threaten his right, sending at the same time four squadrons of cavalry from Brigadier-General Long at Villa Franca to Llerana, to support the Count de Penne Villamur, who was then with the Spanish cavalry of Ge-

neral Castano's corps, to make him fear an attack in front, and General Ballasteros went from Monasterio to Montemolin to threaten his left. These manœuvres had the desired effect; as soon as the enemy saw the advance of Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne near Azuaga, where he had five hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, he abandoned precipitately the place, and retired to Guadalcanal, which place the General Latour Maubourg with the 5th corps quitted in two hours after the arrival of this detachment, and at eleven o'clock at night retired near to Constantino. Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne performed this service in a most judicious and handsome manner.—The weather having been some time fine, and the waters of the Guadiana having subsided, and our preparations having by Lieutenant Colonel Fletcher's activity been nearly completed for the siege of Badajoz, on the 3rd of May I sent three brigades of infantry, a brigade of six pounders, and two squadrons of cavalry, under the orders of Major General the Honourable William Stewart, to invest more close Badajoz, on the south of the River, which he performed with his usual zeal and attention on the 4th. On the 6th instant, I directed the march of the remaining divisions on Badajoz, one by Albuera, the other by Talavera, leaving the cavalry as before placed. On the 7th I came before Badajoz with these divisions. General Castanos furnished also to co-operate in the siege 2,000 men, under the command of Brigadier Don Carlos D'Espagne. On the 8th I directed the brigade of Brigadier-General Kemmis, which had been previously placed on the Chebora, to proceed to the Torre of St. Ingracia, about two miles from Badajoz, on the Campo Maior Road, and to be joined there by the 17th Portuguese regiment, two squadrons of cavalry, and four six-pounders from Elvas; the force to meet at three o'clock in the morning, and the whole to be placed under the orders of the Honourable Major-General William Lumley, to invest the north side, and to attack Fort St. Cristoval. By some accident to the bearer of the orders to Brigadier-General Kemmis, the Officer did not arrive at his post till nine o'clock, the Honourable Major-Gen. Lumley on the approach of the light companies of the brigade, advancing towards the town, with the force he brought from Elvas, the Garrison made a sortie upon it, but was immediately drove back, and

the Grenadiers of the 17th regiment particularly distinguished themselves by charging the enemy, headed by Colonel Turner; the detachment suffered the loss as per Return No. 1.—On the 8th, Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, to protect the further approaches, constructed batteries against the Pardalleiras and Piquerino, on the heights commanding them, though at a considerable distance; and Captain Squire whom the Lieutenant-Colonel had sent to superintend the works intended to be erected against St. Cristoval, began his operations on the 8th. The breaking ground on that side immediately caused great jealousy to the enemy, and he opposed it by a most heavy fire of shot and shell, and on the morning of the 10th, he made a sortie against the battery constructing, with about twelve hundred men, being within five hundred yards of the place. He soon reached the battery, and it having of the covering party allotted to it, only one light infantry company in it, the enemy got possession of it, but had it not for two minutes, as the whole of the covering party that was close to the battery on the slope of the hill, immediately seized their arms and drove the enemy back with considerable loss to him, but I regret to say ours on this occasion must have been considerably greater, from our troops having exposed themselves to the shot and shell of the town and fort of Saint Cristoval, and the musquetry from this latter.—I annex the return of our loss on this day, and in it I have to lament being deprived of the services of Colonel Turner, who in the very short time he had been in the Portuguese service, had given me the greatest satisfaction, and in these two days, the most conspicuous proofs of his gallantry.—I annex the returns of our further loss of men on the respective days that our operations against Badajoz continued, and the Honourable Major-General Lumley's Reports on the circumstances and consequences of the enemy's sorties.—On the 12th I received information from General Blake that Marshal Soult had left Seville on the 10th, and with the avowed intention of coming to Badajoz, his force stated to be fifteen thousand men; and General Latour Maubourg had already again moved upon and occupied Guadalcanal and Llerena, from which places the Count de Penne Villamur had been obliged to retire. As General Blake had come down to Frejenal, and General Ballasteros from

Monasterio had pushed his advances within a league of Seville, I could not judge if this advance of Marshal Soult was merely to oblige these Generals to retire, and leave him undisturbed in Seville, or really as it was given out to be, against me, and with the object of raising the siege of Badajoz, and therefore continued my operations against the place, until the further advance of Soult should more clearly determine this point; but in the middle of the night I received information from General Blake and other quarters of the rapid advance of Marshal Soult, and which left no doubt as to his intentions. I immediately sent to suspend operations against Badajoz, and to commence to remove to Elvas our guns and stores, which unfortunately had been nearly completed to what would have been wanted for the siege. By great exertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher of the Royal Engineers, and Major Dixon of the Artillery, every thing was removed on the evening of the 15th. To Lieutenant-General Leite's (the Governor of the province of Alemtejo) zeal and unwearied activity in whatever regards the service and welfare of his country, it is but just to say, we are on all occasions much indebted; and particularly on this in the getting together the transports necessary to us, and in furnishing and forwarding whatever else could be useful. I seize with pleasure this opportunity of giving to General Leite that praise which he has ever so fully merited. I had been obliged to cover the removal of the stores, &c. to leave the division of Major General the Honourable G. L. Cole before Badajoz. Major-General Cole marched from before Badajoz to join the army here at two o'clock on the morning of the 16th; and arrived at about half an hour before the enemy made his attack. I have, however, the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that the enemy cannot boast of having got a particle of our stores; they were all safely lodged in Elvas, and with the exception of Brigadier-General Kemmis's brigade, which was on the North side of the Guadiana, our troops were all united on the morning of the 16th, to meet the attack and oppose the march of Marshal Soult.

My Lord, *Albuera, 18th May, 1811.*

I have infinite satisfaction in communicating to your Lordship, that the allied army united here under my orders, ob-

tained on the 16th inst. after a most sanguinary contest, a complete victory over that of the enemy, commanded by Marshal Soult; and I shall proceed to relate to your Lordship the circumstances.—In a former report I have informed your Lordship of the advance of Marshal Soult from Seville, and I had in consequence judged it wise, entirely to raise the siege of Badajoz, and prepare to meet him with our united forces, rather than by looking to two objects at once, to risk the loss of both. Marshal Soult, it appears, had been long straining every nerve to collect a force which he thought fully sufficient to his object for the relief of Badajoz, and for this purpose he had drawn considerable numbers from the corps of Marshal Victor and General Sebastiani, and also I believe from the French army of the centre. Having thus completed his preparations, he marched from Seville on the 10th instant, with a corps then estimated at fifteen or sixteen thousand men, and was joined on descending into Estremadura by the corps under General Latour Maubourg, stated to be five thousand men. His Excellency General Blake, as soon as he learnt the advance of Marshal Soult, in strict conformity to the plan proposed by your Lordship, proceeded to form his junction with the corps under my orders, and arrived at Valverde in person on the 14th instant, where, having consulted with his Excellency and General Castanos, it was determined to meet the enemy, and to give him battle.—On finding the determination of the enemy to relieve Badajoz, I had broken up from before that place, and marched the infantry to the position in front of Valverde, except the division of the Honourable Major General G. L. Cole, which, with two thousand Spanish troops, I left to cover the removal of our stores.—The cavalry, which had, according to orders, fallen back as the enemy advanced, was joined at Santa Martha by the cavalry of General Blake; that of General Castanos under the Count de Penne Villamur had been always with it.—As remaining at Valverde, though a stronger position, left Badajoz entirely open, I determined to take up a position (such as could be got, in this widely open country) at this place; thus standing directly between the enemy and Badajoz.—The army was therefore assembled here on the 15th instant. The corps of General Blake, though making a forced march to affect it, only joined in the night, and could not be placed in its posi-

tion till the morning of the 16th instant, when General Cole's division, with the Spanish Brigade under Don Carlos d'Espagne, also joined, and a little before the commencement of the action.—Our cavalry had been forced on the morning of the 15th instant to retire from Santa Martha and joined here. In the afternoon of that day the enemy appeared in front of us. The next morning our disposition for receiving the enemy was made, being formed in two lines, nearly parallel to the river Albuera, on the ridge of the gradual ascent rising from that river, and covering the roads to Badajoz and Valverde; though your Lordship is aware that the whole face of this country is every where passable for all arms. General Blake's corps was on the right, in two lines; its left on the Valverde road, joined the right of Major General the Honourable William Stewart's division, the left of which reached the Badajoz road; where commenced the right of Major General Hamilton's division, which closed the left of the line. General Cole's division, with one brigade of General Hamilton's formed the second line of the British and Portuguese army.—The enemy, on the morning of the 16th, did not long delay his attack; at eight o'clock he was observed to be in movement, and his cavalry was seen passing the rivulet of Albuera, considerably above our right, and shortly after he marched out of the wood opposite to us, a strong force of cavalry, and two heavy columns of infantry, pointing them to our front, as if to attack the village and bridge of Albuera; during this time, under cover of his vastly superior cavalry, he was filing the principal body of his infantry over the river beyond our right, and it was not long before his intention appeared to be to turn us by that flank, and cut us off from Valverde. Major General Cole's division was therefore ordered to form an oblique line to the rear of our right, with his own right thrown back. And the intention of the enemy to attack our right becoming evident, I requested General Blake to form part of his first line, and all his second, to that front, which was done.—The enemy commenced his attack at nine o'clock, not ceasing at the same time to menace our left; and after a strong and gallant resistance of the Spanish troops, he gained the heights upon which they had been formed: meanwhile the division of the Honourable Major General William Stewart had been brought up to support them; and that of Major

General Hamilton brought to the left of the Spanish line, and formed in contiguous close columns of battalions, to be moveable in any direction. The Portuguese brigade of cavalry, under Brigadier General Otway, remained at some distance on the left of this, to check any attempt of the enemy below the village.—As the heights the enemy had gained, raked and entirely commanded our whole position, it became necessary to make every effort to retake and maintain them; and a noble one was made by the division of General Stewart, headed by that gallant officer. Nearly at the beginning of the enemy's attack, a heavy storm of rain came on, which, with the smoke from the firing, rendered it impossible to discern any thing distinctly.—This, with the nature of the ground, had been extremely favourable to the enemy in forming his columns, and in his subsequent attack.—The right brigade of General Stewart's division, under Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, first came into action, and behaved in the most gallant manner, and finding that the enemy's column could not be shaken by fire, proceeded to attack it with the bayonet; and, while in the act of charging, a body of Polish lancers (cavalry) which the thickness of the atmosphere and the nature of the ground had concealed, (and which was, besides, mistaken by those of the brigade when discovered for Spanish cavalry, and therefore not fired upon,) turned it; and being thus attacked unexpectedly in the rear was unfortunately broken and suffered immensely. The 31st regiment, being the left one of the brigade, alone escaped this charge, and under the command of Major L'Estrange kept its ground, until the arrival of the 3d brigade, under Major-General Hoghton. The conduct of this brigade was most conspicuously gallant, and that of the 2d brigade, under the command of the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie was not less so. Major General Hoghton, cheering on his brigade to the charge, fell pierced by wounds. Though the enemy's principal attack was on this point of the right, he also made a continual attempt upon that part of our original front at the village and bridge, which were defended in the most gallant manner by Major-General Baron Alten and the light infantry brigade of the German Legion, whose conduct was, in every point of view, conspicuously good. This point now formed our left, and Major-General Hamilton's division had been brought

up there; and he was left to direct the defence of that point, whilst the enemy's attack continued on our right, a considerable proportion of the Spanish troops supporting the defence of this place. The enemy's cavalry, on his infantry attempting to force our right, had endeavoured to turn it; but by the able manœuvres of Major-General the Honourable William Lumley, commanding the allied cavalry, though vastly inferior to that of the enemy in number, his endeavours were foiled. Major-General Cole, seeing the attack of the enemy, very judiciously bringing up his left a little, marched in line to attack the enemy's left, and arrived most opportunely to contribute, with the charges of the brigades of General Stewart's division, to force the enemy to abandon his situation, and retire precipitately, and to take refuge under his reserve; here the Fusileer brigade particularly distinguished itself. He was pursued by the Allies to a considerable distance, and as far as I thought it prudent with his immense superiority of cavalry; and I contented myself with seeing him driven across the Albuera.—I have every reason to speak favourably of the manner in which our artillery was served, and fought; and Major Hartman, commanding the British, and Major Dickson, commanding the Portuguese, and the officers and men, are entitled to my thanks. The four guns of the horse artillery, commanded by Captain Lefebure, did great execution on the enemy's cavalry, and one brigade of Spanish artillery (the only one in the field) I saw equally gallantly and well served. We lost, in the misfortune which occurred to the brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne (whom General Stewart reports to have acted and was then acting in a most noble manner, leading on the brigade in admirable order) one howitzer, which the enemy, before the arrival of the gallant General Hoghton's brigade, had time to carry off, with two hundred or three hundred prisoners of that brigade. After he had been beaten from this, his principal attack, he still continued that near the village, on which he never could make any impression or cross the rivulet, though I had been obliged to bring a very great proportion of the troops from it, to support the principal point of attack; but the enemy, seeing his main attack defeated, relaxed in his attempt there also. The Portuguese division of Major-General Hamilton, in every instance evinced the utmost steadiness and courage,

and manœuvred equally well with the British.—Brigadier-General Harvey's Portuguese brigade, belonging to General Cole's division, had an opportunity of distinguishing itself when marching in line across the plain, by repulsing with the utmost steadiness a charge of the enemy's cavalry.—It is impossible to enumerate every instance of discipline and valour shewn on this severely contested day. But never were troops that more valiantly or more gloriously maintained the honour of their respective countries. I have not been able to particularize the Spanish divisions, brigades, or regiments, that were particularly engaged, because I am not acquainted with their denominations or names; but I have great pleasure in saying that their behaviour was most gallant and honourable; and though from the superior number and weight of the enemy's force, that part of them that were in the position attacked were obliged to cede the ground, it was after a gallant resistance, and they continued in good order to support their Allies; and I doubt not, his Excellency General Blake will do ample justice on this head, by making honourable mention of the deserving.—The battle commenced at nine o'clock, and continued without interruption till two in the afternoon, when the enemy having been driven over the Albuera, for the remainder of the day there was but cannonading and skirmishing.—It is impossible by any description to do justice to the distinguished gallantry of the troops, but every individual most nobly did his duty, and which will be well proved by the great loss we have suffered, though repulsing the enemy; and it was observed, that our dead, particularly the 57th regiment, were lying, as they had fought, in ranks, and every wound was in the front.—The Honourable Major-General William Stewart most particularly distinguished himself, and conducted much to the honour of the day; he received two contusions, but would not quit the field. Major-General the Honourable G. L. Cole is also entitled to every praise; and I have to regret being deprived for some time of his services, by the wound he has received. The Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Abercrombie, commanding the 2d brigade, 2d division, and Major L'Estrange, 31st regiment, deserve to be particularly mentioned; and nothing could exceed the conduct and gallantry of Colonel Inglis, at the head of his regiment. To the Honourable Major-General William Lumley,

for the very able manner in which he opposed the numerous cavalry of the enemy, and foiled him in his object, I am particularly indebted. To Major General Hamilton, who commanded on the left, during the severe attack upon our right, I also much indebted; and the Portuguese brigade of Brigadier-Generals Fonseca and Archibald Campbell, deserve to be mentioned. To Major-General Alten, and to the excellent Brigade under his orders, I have much praise to give; and it is with great pleasure I assure your Lordship that the good and gallant conduct of every corps, and of every person, was in proportion to the opportunity that offered for distinguishing themselves. I know not an individual who did not do his duty. I have, I fear, to regret the loss to the service of Colonel Collings commanding a Portuguese Brigade, his leg having been carried off by a cannon shot. He is an officer of great merit; and I deeply lament the death of Major-General Hoghton and of those two promising officers Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Wm. Myers and Lieutenant-Colonel Duckworth.—It is most pleasing to me to inform your Lordship, not only of the steady and gallant conduct of our allies, the Spanish troops, under his Excellency General Blake, but also to assure you that the most perfect harmony has subsisted between us, and that General Blake not only conformed in all things to the general line proposed by your Lordship, but in the details and in whatever I suggested to his Excellency, I received the most immediate and cordial assent and co-operation; and nothing was omitted on his part, to ensure the success of our united efforts; and during the battle, he most essentially, by his experience, knowledge, and zeal, contributed to its fortunate result.—His Excellency the Captain General Castanos who had united the few troops he had in a state to be brought into the field, to those of General Blake, and placed them under his orders, assisted in person in the field; and not only on this, but on all occasions, I am much indebted to General Castanos, who is ever beforehand in giving whatever can be beneficial to the success of the common cause.—Though I unfortunately cannot point out the corps or many of the individuals of the Spanish troops that distinguished themselves, yet I will not omit to mention the names of General Vallesteros, whose gallantry was most conspicuous, as of the corps he had under his command; and the same of Ge-

nerals Zayas and of Don Carlos D'Espagne. The Spanish cavalry have behaved extremely well, and the Count de Penne Villamur is particularly deserving to be mentioned.—I annex the return of our loss in this hard contested day: it is very severe, and in addition to it is the loss of the troops under his Excellency General Blake, who are killed, missing, and wounded, but of which I have not the return. The loss of the enemy, though I cannot know what it is, must be still more severe. He has left on the field of battle about two thousand dead, and we have taken from nine hundred to one thousand prisoners. He has had five generals killed and wounded; of the former Generals of division Werle and Pefim; and Gazan and two others amongst the latter.—His force was much more considerable than we had been informed of, as I do not think he displayed less than from twenty to twenty-two thousand infantry, and he certainly had four thousand cavalry with a numerous and heavy artillery. His overbearing cavalry cramped and confined all our operations, and with his artillery saved his infantry, after its rout. He retired after the battle to the ground he had been previously on, but occupying it in position; and on this morning, or rather during the night, commenced his retreat on the road he came, towards Seville, and has abandoned Badajoz to its fate. He left a number of his wounded on the ground he had retired to, and to which we are administering what assistance we can. I have sent our cavalry to follow the enemy, but in that arm he is too powerful for us to attempt any thing against him in the plains he is traversing.—Thus we have reaped the advantage we proposed from our opposition to the attempts of the enemy; and whilst he has been forced to abandon the object for which he has almost stripped Andalusia of troops, instead of having accomplished the haughty boasts with which Marshal Soult barangued his troops on leaving Seville, he returns there with a curtailed army, and what perhaps may be still more hurtful to him, with a diminished reputation.—In enumerating the services received from the Officers of my own Staff, I must particularly call your Lordship's attention to those of Brigadier-General d'Urban, Quarter-Master-General to the Portuguese army; and which I cannot sufficiently praise, though I can appreciate. On all occasions I have felt the benefits of his talents and services, and

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more particularly on this, where they very essentially contributed to the success of the day; and I cannot here omit the name of Lieutenant-Colonel Hardinge, Deputy Quarter-Master-General to the Portuguese troops, whose talent and exertions deserve my thanks. To Brigadier-General Mozinho Adjutant-General of the Portuguese army, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Rooke, Assistant-Adjutant-General to the united British and Portuguese force, and to Brigadier-General Lemos, and to the Officers of my own personal Staff, I am indebted for their assistance.—To the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Arbuthnot (Major in his Majesty's service), I am also much indebted, and he is the bearer of this to your Lordship, and is fully enabled to give you any further information you may desire, and is most deserving of any favour your Lordship may be pleased to recommend him for, to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent.—I have, &c.

(Signed) W. C. BERESFORD,
Marshal and Lieut. Gen.

P. S. Major-General Hamilton's Division, and Brigadier-General Madden's Brigade of Portuguese cavalry march tomorrow morning to re-invest Badajoz on the South Side of the Guadiana.

W. C. B.

No. I.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the Corps of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. under the immediate Orders of Marshal Sir W. Carr Beresford, K. B. in an Attack of the Enemy's Post before Badajoz, on the 8th May, 1811.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—5 rank and file wounded.

97th Foot—6 rank and file wounded.

Total British Loss—11 rank and file wounded.

Portuguese Loss—1 rank and file killed; 1 Ensign, 18 rank and file wounded.

General Total—1 rank and file killed; 1 Ensign, 29 rank and file wounded.

Name of Officer wounded.

17th Portuguese Regiment — Ensign Luiz Valoza.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Major-Gen. and Adj.-Gen.

No. II.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the Corps of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. under the immediate Orders

of Marshal Sir W. Carr Beresford, K. B. in the Repulse of a Sortie from Badajoz, on the Morning of the 10th May, 1811.

Royal Engineers—1 Lieutenant wounded.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—1 Captain, 8 rank and file, killed; 1 Major, 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 2 Ensigns, 1 Serjeant, 102 rank and file, wounded.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—1 Serjeant, 11 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 1 Major, 5 Lieutenants, 5 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 180 rank and file, wounded.

2d Batt. 48th Foot—1 rank and file killed.

5th Batt. 60th Foot—1 rank and file, killed; 1 Captain, 7 rank and file wounded.

97th Foot—1 Serjeant, 8 rank and file killed; 3 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 3 Serjeants, 58 rank and file, wounded.

Total British Loss—1 Captain, 2 Serjeants, 29 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Majors, 2 Captains, 10 Lieutenants, 4 Ensigns, 9 Serjeants, 3 drummers, 347 rank and file wounded.

Portuguese Loss—1 Colonel, 2 Captains, 1 drummer, 34 rank and file, wounded; 12 rank and file missing.

General Loss—1 Captain, 2 Serjeants, 29 rank and file, killed; 1 Colonel, 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Majors, 4 Captains, 10 Lieutenants, 4 Ensigns, 9 Serjeants, 4 drummers, 381 rank and file wounded; 12 rank and file missing.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Major-Gen. and Adj.-Gen.

Names of the Officers killed, wounded, and missing, on the 10th May, 1811.

Killed.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—Captain Smith.

Wounded.

Royal Engineers — Lieutenant Reid, slightly.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—Major Birmingham, (since dead); Captain Pring, severely; Lieutenant Levinge, Ensigns M'Coard and Hanley.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, slightly; Major Thornton, do.; Lieutenant Street, slightly; Lieutenant Thoreau; Lieutenant Strawbenzie, severely; Lieutenants Kelly and Brown.

5th Batt. 60th Foot—Captain Prevost, severely.

97th Foot—Lieut. Coppinger, severely; Lieutenant Daunt, slightly; Lieutenant Kettlewell, Ensign Dowman, lost an arm; Ensign Downing, severely.

Portuguese wounded.

17th Regiment—Colonel Turner severely; Captains Buquet and Maxwell.

No. III.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing, of the Corps of the Army under the Command of Lieutenant-General Lord Viscount Wellington, K. B. under the immediate Orders of Marshal Sir W. C. Beresford, K. B. in the Trenches and Batteries before Badajoz, between the 8th and 15th of May, 1811, inclusive.

Royal Engineers—1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, killed; 2 Captains wounded.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—1 Serjeant, 4 rank and file, killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 2 Lieutenants, 8 Serjeants, 1 drummer, 52 rank and file, wounded.

2d Batt. 34th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—10 rank and file killed; 2 Captains, 1 Lieutenant, 18 rank and file, wounded.

5th Batt. 60th Foot—1 rank and file wounded.

97th Foot—7 rank and file killed, 19 rank and file wounded.

2d Light Battalion, King's German Legion—1 rank and file wounded.

Total British Loss—1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 21 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 4 Captains, 3 Lieutenants, 8 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 92 rank and file, wounded.

Portuguese Loss—1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 2 Serjeants, 40 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Ensign, 4 Serjeants, 1 Drummer, 88 rank and file wounded; 1 Lieutenant, 22 rank and file missing.

General Loss—1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 3 Serjeants, 61 rank and file killed; 1 Lieutenant-Colonel, 4 Captains, 4 Lieutenants, 1 Ensign, 12 Serjeants, 2 Drummers, 180 rank and file wounded; 1 Lieutenant, 22 rank and file missing.

(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Major-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

Names of Officers killed, wounded, and missing of the Army between the 8th and 15th May, inclusive.

Killed.

Royal Engineers—Captain Dickinson, Lieutenant Melville.

Wounded.

Royal Engineers—Captain Ross, Captain Boteler, severely.

3d Batt. 27th Foot—Lieutenant-Colonel M'Lean; Lieutenants Gordon and Dobbins, slightly.

1st Batt. 40th Foot—Captains Heyland and Wood, Lieutenant Patler.

Portuguese killed.

17th Regiment—Ensign Raymond de Viagas.

1st Batt. L. L. Leg.—Lieut. Cæsar de Fontes.

Wounded.

17th Regiment—Lieut. John Iniceps, Ensign Joao Anselmo.

Missing.

1st Batt. L. L. Leg.—Lieut. Joaquim de Pinto.
(Signed) CHARLES STEWART,
Major-Gen. and Adj. Gen.

No. IV.

Return of killed, wounded, and missing of the Corps of the Army under Command of Lieut. General Viscount Wellington, K. B. under the immediate Orders of Marshal Sir William Carr Beresford, K. B. in the Battle with the French Army commanded by Marshal Soult, at Albuera, on the 16th May, 1811.

General Staff—1 killed, 7 wounded.

Royal British Artillery—3 rank and file, 9 horses killed; 1 Captain, 10 rank and file, 10 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 1 horse missing.

Royal Germany Artillery—24 horses killed; 1 Lieutenant, 16 rank and file wounded; 1 Lieutenant, 1 Trumpeter, 29 rank and file, 10 horses missing.

3d Dragoon Guards—1 Lieutenant, 9 rank and file, 9 horses, killed; 9 rank and file, 6 horses, wounded; 1 rank and file, 4 horses, missing.

4th Dragoons—1 Serjeant, 2 rank and file, 11 horses, killed; 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 1 Serjeant, 1 Trumpeter, 15 rank and file, 10 horses wounded; 2 Captains, 2 rank and file, 2 horses, missing.

13th Light Dragoons—1 horse killed; 1 rank and file wounded.

(To be continued.)